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Gendering the diversification of diversity
The Belgian hijab (in) question
GILY COENE
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
CHIA LONGMAN
Ghent University, Belgium
ABSTRACT This article presents an analysis of the recent headscarf debate in
Belgium, and explores in particular to what extent issues of gender equality and
feminist arguments were central to the discussion. It is argued that compared to
France, concerns about secularity and state-neutrality, national identity and equality,
all find resonance in the Belgian context, but are articulated in a more ambiguous
and less ‘principled’ way. This partly explains the paradoxical situation in which,
despite a widespread resistance to a general law banning the wearing of religious
symbols in public schools, in practice, headscarf prohibitions are on the rise through-
out various regions of the country. Although issues of gender equality and cultural
diversity often cut and flow across debates and policies in European nation states,
the Belgian hijab question provides a unique case, because of various lines of
fracture and processes of increasing diversification that characterize Belgian society.
KEY WORDS gender equality ● headscarves ● multiculturalism ● national
identity ● neutrality of the state ● public education
INTRODUCTION
Within the past two decades, the hijab, particularly the headscarf and to a
lesser extent, forms of dress such as the niqab, burqa or chador, has given
rise to controversies in many different European countries. The issue has
been most passionately debated in France, where it led in 2004 to legislation
that prohibits the wearing of a headscarf by pupils within public schools.
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Following the recommendations of the French independent Commission de
Réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République
(Commission to Reflect on the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the
Republic), better known as the Stasi Commission, the French parliament
overwhelmingly passed a law that prohibits students of primary and second-
ary public schools from wearing dress and insignia that ‘conspicuously
manifest a religious affiliation’. Although the law applies to other religious
insignia, it was generally perceived to be about the hijab or headscarf.
In and outside academia, the headscarf controversy has been widely
debated and is often depicted as symptomatic of the crisis of multicultural-
ism and the increasing intolerance towards Islam and Muslim minorities.
Within France, although the headscarf ban was also contested by some
academics, feminist and left-wing groups for being westernizing, colonialist
and Islamophobic, a large majority seemed to support the law. The ban has
mainly been defended as preserving the central values of the secular phil-
osophy and the doctrine of laïcité that implies, amongst others, equality
before the law, non-discrimination and the guarantee of equal rights for all
(see e.g. Weil, 2005).
In comparison to some of the other cultural practices discussed within
this issue, debates over the hijab or headscarf are somewhat exceptionally
positioned, for in the case of issues such as honour-related violence or
forced marriages, the violation of women’s rights as such is not in question
(cf. Dustin, 2006). So far as the hijab is concerned, its perception and
interpretation in terms of gender equality and women’s rights is much more
contested. From one side, feminists denounce the headscarf as an instru-
ment of women’s oppression, while others emphasize the neocolonial and
assimilationist agenda behind the highly gendered rhetoric of ‘unveiling’.
On the political and judicial level, the principle of gender equality and
women’s rights seems to point in opposite directions, with hijab bans being
defended in terms of the right of protection against gendered oppression,
and protests against these bans emphasizing Muslim women’s rights to
religious freedom and personal choice.
In this article, we look at the way such arguments were played out in the
recent headscarf debate in the context of the federal Belgian nation state.
We argue that despite some variation in the arguments between the French-
speaking and Dutch-speaking communities in Belgium, and the resistance
to introduce a general hijab ban in public schools and places, in practice,
headscarf prohibitions are increasing. From a comparative perspective, the
Belgian hijab question therefore provides a unique case, because of various
lines of fracture and processes of increasing diversification that character-
ize Belgian society.
The first section offers an introduction and explanation of the current
state of affairs and debates, mainly in regard to the field of education.
Next, a comparison with France is made in regard to the concepts and
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interpretation of laïcité (secularism) and multiculturalism. The final section
explores how gender equality, women’s rights and emancipation were
articulated in the public debate and reviews some of the feminist activism
that developed in response to the political and media debate, both by the
white feminist movement and Muslim women. Although the headscarf
controversy has contributed to an increasing visibility of minority women
and some recognition of their interests on the political agenda and in civil
society, it is also argued that the question of gender equality and cultural
diversity is not a very prominent concern compared to the increasing atten-
tion to issues of secularity and religious pluralism. Thus, minority women
still have a long way to go in the struggle for recognition – whether as
women in minorities or as minority women. Although it remains an open
question how policies will further evolve, the headscarf has obviously
opened a Pandora’s Box, bringing old wounds and conflicts back into the
world of contemporary politics.
HEADSCARF CONTROVERSIES AND BELGIAN
COMPROMISES
At the level of both political and media representation and public policy,
tensions between gender equality and cultural diversity in Belgium share
many parallels with, and are greatly influenced by, those in other European
countries and liberal democracies. Although abusive practices, such as forced
marriages, honour-related violence and female genital mutilation (FGM)
have been only marginally addressed, the hijab has recurrently been a topic
of broad and heated political and media contention, especially in the wake
of the report of the Stasi Commission on religious symbols and the law on
laïcité in France. Thus, in January 2004, two (Francophone) Belgian senators
introduced a proposal of resolution to ‘safeguard the equality between men
and women and the neutrality of the state in official schools and in public
services by banning the wearing of conspicuous signs of a religious convic-
tion’. As the title betrays, the wearing of religious symbols in official schools
and public services was perceived as endangering gender equality and state-
neutrality. Although the proposal was firmly rejected, and despite wide-
spread ‘resistance’ to adopting a policy similar to that in France, in daily
practice, veiling prohibitions have turned out to be remarkably similar, with
schools in Brussels, Francophone Belgium and Flanders increasingly issuing
their own bans. The problem is also raised in other contexts, such as in
private and public employment. In addition, a number of cities have issued
total bans against extreme forms of veiling in public, such as the burqa.
In the school year 1989–90, when the first ‘headscarf affair’ took place in
France, pupils wearing a headscarf were excluded from attending lessons in
ETHNICITIES 8(3)304
302-321 092445 Coene (D)  22/7/08  15:54  Page 304
305
a school in St-Jans-Molenbeek (Brussels) on the basis of school regulations
that explicitly prohibited wearing head coverings. After a failed attempt at
compromise, the conflict escalated and the parents of 51 pupils lodged a
court appeal. The summary judgment largely confirmed the compromise
proposed by the school, according to which the wearing of a headscarf was
only partly admitted, such as during courses taught by a male teacher. When
the girls refused to abide by these restrictions, they were expelled from
school, and filed a petition for cancellation at the Belgian Conseil d’Etat
(State Council). In his report, the auditor relied on the advice of the French
Conseil d’Etat of 27 November 1989. In response to the First French head-
scarf affair in which three girls were sent from school in the Creil depart-
ment, French Minister of Education Lionel Jospin brought the case to the
French State Council for judicial advice. The Council argued that the
principle of laïcité did not conflict with the wearing of religious symbols
by pupils in schools, except if these signs could be considered as an act of
pressure, proselytism, propaganda or interfered with the dignity of freedom
of the student or other members of the school community. The application
of an exception ground had to be demonstrated in each individual case and
this excluded the possibility of a ban as a general school rule.1 Likewise, the
auditor of the Belgian State Council confirmed that a ban on the wearing
of religious symbols was to be considered an infringement of the principle
of neutrality, unless it was based on one of the aforementioned exceptive
clauses. In this case, the auditor argued that the decision of the school fitted
within this requirement, for the girls disturbed regular teaching activities
and safety was endangered. The restrictions were thus considered to be
legitimate and the plaintiffs did not take any further legal actions.2 A
number of disputes concerning the headscarf arose in the years to follow,
and were not only limited to Brussels or Francophone Belgium.3
However, in comparison to France, the situation on the school front in
Belgium remained relatively quiet until the beginning of the school year
2003–04. The French-speaking athenaeum II of Laken (Brussels), a school
where 80 percent of pupils were of immigrant origin, adopted in its school
regulation a provision that prohibited the wearing of a headscarf. Accord-
ing to the school management, the prohibition was required to put a halt to
a rising ‘radicalization’ (De Standaard, 2003). At the time, such a ban was
not exceptional in Brussels: the majority of schools had already introduced
similar regulations, but the event caught public attention, because of both
the parallel developments in France and the protest marches of the Brussels
action group ‘Touche pas à mon foulard’ (Do not touch my headscarf) and
the Arab European League (AEL).4
In January 2004, soon after the launch of the report of the French Stasi
Commission (Stasi, 2003), two (Francophone) Belgian senators, Alain
Destexhe (Mouvement Réformateur Liberaux) and Anne-Marie Lizin
(Parti Socialiste) introduced a proposal of resolution banning religious
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symbols in official schools and public services. Their text largely resembled
the conclusions and recommendations of the Stasi Commission, except for
a more outspoken focus on gender equality. Furthermore, the proposal was
not confined to public schools, but also aimed at prohibiting the wearing of
religious symbols by employees in government and public office.
As the major part of governmental authorities on education and public
services are regionalized, such a law could acquire force for the whole
Belgian territory only if all regional parliaments subscribed, and the reso-
lution therefore called for the engagement of the different legislative bodies
in the debate. The proposal, however, was by no means welcomed and
largely dismissed as inapplicable to the Belgian context. In response, the
Minister of Integration and Equal Opportunities, Marie Arena (and Social-
ist Party member Anne-Marie Lizin), launched a Commission on Inter-
cultural Dialogue that gained support from the federal government. It was
assigned the task of drawing up a state of affairs on intercultural relations
in Belgium on the basis of four main themes: citizenship, gender equality,
the place of religion in a secular society and the working principles of
government services. Although the members of the Commission were
divided over the necessity of any law or general rule, many seemed to agree
that Belgium should not follow the French path (CID, 2005: 89–90). In
contrast to the Stasi Commission, where the meaning of laïcité was central,
the Commission on Intercultural Dialogue covered a broad range of
questions regarding multicultural society. As for issues of gender, the
Commission’s report deals with equality between women and men, and yet
not in relation to the issue of the headscarf (CID, 2005). This may reflect
the Commission finding the topic either too controversial or simply irrele-
vant to its discussion. On the basis of numerous hearings, the Commission
concluded that ‘there is in any case a consensus over the fact that the real
stakes of the debate on intercultural society lie elsewhere rather than the
headscarf issue’ (CID, 2005: 88, OVP trans.). Although this Commission
proved to be a unique exercise in putting the status of multiculturalism to
the test in the various regions of the country and the principles of
citizenship in the Belgian federalized state, its conclusions remain mostly
informative rather than advisory.
Despite the initial call for ‘dialogue’, at the time of writing this, schools
are increasingly introducing restrictive provisions on headscarves in their
school regulations, in which reference is made either to the wearing of
head coverings or religious symbols. In addition to Brussels, provisions
have been predominantly introduced in cities such as Antwerp (Flanders)
and Charleroi (Wallonia). Recently, the newspaper Le Soir (De Meule-
naere and Dorzee, 2007) revealed that 90 percent of Brussels schools
already apply such a prohibition. While none of the representative organs
and ministerial departments have declared themselves in favour of a
general repressive rule, the decision to leave it up to the local school
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boards to decide has led to practices that have turned out to be quite
restrictive.
To explain these tendencies, we need to stress first that governmental
authority over education is regionalized in Belgium, which allows the three
communities to develop their own policies.5 In addition, education is
institutionalized within different organizational frameworks or ‘pillars’ that
enjoy a large degree of autonomy: i.e. official or public education (governed
at the community, provincial or municipal level) and free – mainly Catholic
– education. While official education is more prominent in the French-
speaking part, the majority of schools in Flanders are Catholic, yet fully
state-subsidized. Although Catholic schools may also decide whether the
wearing of a headscarf fits their particular educational project, not many
seem to allow it. However, they rarely reach the less advantaged and have
the least pupils of migrant origin. The refusal to accommodate pupils with
different religious backgrounds, for instance by providing the alternative of
Islamic teaching, thus reinforces the social gap and duality between ‘white’
Catholic schools and ‘coloured’ official schools. This helps to explain the
particular sensitivity of official school boards to the headscarf as a visible
symbol of immigrants’ otherness. Likewise, in the absence of one single
principle or rule, a domino-effect has evoked an escalation; the more
schools introduce a ban, the more other schools feel the need to do the
same, if only to avoid becoming ‘concentration-schools’ of less-advantaged
immigrant children. In view of a general trend towards taking a more
judicial approach, schools seem to take a more defensive attitude within
their school regulations, because disputes in the course of the year can be
anticipated by implementing clear and strict rules that parents are required
to accept before the children can go to that school. Up until now, courts
have not been receptive to complaints against these kinds of limitations.6 In
other words, the decentralization of decision-making to local school boards,
in which parents are also represented, has not led towards a greater
tolerance.
Thus one can read in a memorandum of the representative body of
Flemish Community Education (Vlaamse Raad voor het Gemeenschapson-
derwijs; GO!, 2007) that it relies on the philosophy of ‘active pluralism’. This
asserts the right of pupils to express rather than impede their own view of
life (in as far as this does not hinder the rights of others). Although the
memorandum allows for a tolerant attitude towards the wearing of religious
symbols by pupils, teachers or staff are not allowed to wear symbols that
express their (religious or other) beliefs. An exception is made for teachers
of religious courses. Unlike in France, Islam is taught in official schools,
alongside other state-recognized religions and non-religious moral
education. Although the wearing of a headscarf by teachers of Islamic
religion is usually tolerated, two Islamic teachers in an official school in
Brussels were fired in 2006 for refusing to remove their headscarf outside
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the Islamic class. The reasoning behind this decision was that, although the
school board was not to interfere with religious teaching and customs
during the reserved hours and courses, teachers should abide by the
requirements of neutrality when in contact with other (non-Islamic) pupils
in the school. Rather an exception than a rule, this particular case never-
theless illuminates some of the tensions of the particular ‘neutrality
approach’.
In sum, although Belgium has not introduced similar legislation against
religious symbols, including the headscarf, to that of France, this has not
prevented very similar developments unfolding in practice. This may seem
paradoxical given the strong resistance against the French law and its
underlying philosophy. The next section seeks to offer some explanation.
FRENCH L AÏCITÉ AND BELGIAN MULTICULTURALISM
Contextualizing the hijab issue in terms of the ‘policies’ and ‘politics’ of
dealing with diversity is, in view of the highly diversified Belgian ‘federal’
context, no easy task.
First, as a paradox of 19th-century nation building and in order to
manage a highly diversified society, the Belgian state has developed into a
complex political and institutional structure. As far as the linguistic-cultural
diversity between the Flemish and the Francophone is concerned, a
strong multiculturalism has been adopted, leading to some governmental
autonomy of different communities and regions within the federal state.
Subsequent state reforms and a decentralization of policy instruments
among the regions have reinforced differences in policies between Flanders
and Wallonia, in such a way that (at least) two distinct philosophies of inte-
gration can be detected: Flemish multiculturalism, inspired by the earlier
Dutch and Anglo-Saxon model of ethnic minority policies; and Francoph-
one integration policies, more aligned with the French Republican and
citizenship model. In this regard, it is not surprising that, at the outset, the
headscarf controversy was more obviously alive in Brussels and Franco-
phone Belgium. However, this view is highly misleading if it leads one to
expect a more tolerant attitude in so-called ‘multicultural’ Flanders. This
does not seem to be the case, or, as we aim to demonstrate, is at least not
supported by unambiguous evidence.
Second, although integration policies are federalized, religious matters
and state-neutrality are federal and constitutional matters, thus making
reference to the Belgian context particularly significant. As such, the
Belgian case also presents a compromising model between French
secularism and the Dutch ‘pillarized’ model of religious pluralism. Both
policy-levels and institutional logics ambiguously shape the context in
ETHNICITIES 8(3)308
302-321 092445 Coene (D)  22/7/08  15:54  Page 308
309
which the hijab is debated and how the issue is perceived; i.e. in terms of
multicultural recognition or in terms of state-neutrality.
However, despite all these divergences, an underlying logic of compro-
mise and pragmatism often determines particular policy outcomes on
migrant issues. As Hassan Bousetta and Dirk Jacobs (2006) explain in a
discussion of multiculturalism, citizenship and Islam in Belgium, the
2003–04 Belgian headscarf debate may count as an obvious example of this
typical Belgian multicultural pragmatism. This mainly implies that substan-
tial debates and clear-cut positions on the public recognition of minority
cultural and religious practices in the public sphere are avoided, and that
decisions are therefore left over for civil society and the judiciary. In this
regard, there is a considerable difference between the ‘debates’ on multi-
cultural issues on the one hand and the ‘practice’ of multicultural policies
on the other. Although we agree that this ‘multicultural pragmatism’ largely
explains the lack of a single policy on the headscarf and the contradictory
responses in society, it nevertheless leaves out of the question why this
particular issue has turned out to be so controversial. Moreover, it leaves
concerns on gender equality and the impact of women’s activism
unexplored.
‘Ceci n’est pas une voile’
At the time the French legislation was enacted, the headscarf controversy
was already the focus of a passionate media and political debate in Belgium,
with similar concerns about gender equality and the neutrality of state and
official education being raised, although with divergent articulations. The
impact of the French debate in Belgium is not entirely unanticipated, for
these are neighbouring countries with a common language and a shared
history, particularly in regard to church–state relations. After the French
Revolution, Belgian territory was briefly under French rule and the anti-
clerical revolutionary spirit left some legacy. However, after the defeat of
Napoleon, Belgian territory came under Dutch Protestant rule, in opposi-
tion to which Liberals and Catholics joined forces, subsequently leading to
Belgian independence. The product of an extraordinary coalition between
Catholics and Liberals, the 1831 Constitution thus generously stipulated
religious freedom as both positive and negative, guaranteeing the freedom
of worship and practice and the freedom to demonstrate one’s opinion on
all matters (article 19), as well as giving the assurance that no one could be
obliged to contribute in any way whatsoever to the acts and ceremonies of
a religion, nor to observe the days of rest (article 20). Further, it was
declared that the state would not interfere in the nomination or installation
of clerics but would finance Catholic clerics, as a compensation for the
confiscation of clerical property during the era of the French Revolution.
Although the French state continued to provide financial support for the
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maintenance and preservation of religious buildings, article 2 of the French
Law of separation of 1905 explicitly declares that the state neither recog-
nizes nor subsidizes any religion. Thus, in contrast to France, where the law
of 1905 established a strict separation of church and state, Belgium earlier
adopted a regime of ‘active neutrality’. Recognition was promptly
extended to other religions (Protestantism, Anglicanism, Judaism) and
more recently to Islam (1974), the Greek Orthodox Church (1985) and
later to non-religious philosophical or secular humanist organizations,
somehow ironically referred to as ‘La Laïcité organisé’. In 2007, organized
Buddhism also applied for state recognition. In contrast to countries such
as France and the Netherlands, the compensation regime became perma-
nently institutionalized, and was extended on the basis of equal treatment
of other ‘recognized’ religions or philosophies. Nevertheless, the distri-
bution of benefits and funding is both non-transparent and unequal, for
the Catholic Church still receives the vast amount of the total budget
(cf. Husson, 2005).
Differences between France and Belgium are most noticeable in the field
of public education. Given the importance of education to the republican
project, the doctrine of laïcité has found its fullest application in state
schools. As explained by Cécile Laborde (2005: 323–5), the neutrality of
schools in France implied the full avoidance of any reference to religion in
the content of education, as well as the removal of any religious symbols
from classrooms. Instead, children were to be taught about the basic prin-
ciples of universal morality and the principles and their duties to the French
Republic. Likewise, teachers were instructed to refrain from any offence or
disturbance of children’s conscience or parents’ beliefs. The idea that true
respect for the diversity of beliefs and inclusiveness requires that schools
refrain from either endorsing or criticizing religious beliefs remains
indicative in the recent headscarf debate. For instance, according to Stasi
Commission member Jacqueline Costa Lascoux, laïcité should be
considered as ‘a tribute to the spiritual’ for it ‘takes very seriously the
choices dictated by religious considerations and recognizes as its fair value
the importance they can have for the faithful’ (2004: 2).
Although the Belgian Constitution declares that education organized by
the communities (previously the federal state) should be neutral, implying,
amongst other things, respect for the philosophical, ideological and religious
beliefs of pupils and parents, it also states that schools organized by public
authorities should offer a choice between the teaching of one of the recog-
nized religions and non-religious moral teaching. In addition, all pupils of
school age are guaranteed the right to religious or non-religious moral
education at the community’s (formerly the federal state) expense. Again,
this regulation is the compromise outcome of long-standing ‘school battles’,
although it did in the end pacify religious-ideological divides and may count
as a unique example of managing religious and philosophical diversity.
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The interpretation of neutrality in the field of education did not outlaw a
reference to religion, but provided (some) space for religious teaching and
practice.
Although French secularism remained an appealing ideal for socialist
and liberal movements in the continuing struggle against the Catholic
dominance of society in the 19th and 20th centuries, it could never take
ground in Belgian society as in France. As a result of the larger impact of
the labour and socialist movement in earlier industrialized Wallonia, and
successive electoral successes of the Parti Socialiste, the secularization of
civil society became more advanced in the French-speaking part of the
country. In Flanders, subsequent Catholic and Christian parties were nearly
continuously in power. Up to the present, and in contrast to a general
tendency of secularization of society and the decline of Catholic religious
practice, the Christian ‘pillar’ still embraces the majority of schools, hospi-
tals and caring institutions in Flanders, `although wholly subsidized by the
state. Public schools, hospitals etc. largely evolved as ‘secular’ and anti-
clerical alternatives to the existing Catholic organizations and institutions.
For instance, a symbolic and prominent area of anti-clerical struggle in the
past (although not yet fully completed) was the removal of Christian cruci-
fixes in public schools, hospitals and court rooms. Hence, public manifesta-
tions of new religious groups in contemporary society are often perceived
to undermine these fragile achievements in terms of neutralizing public
spaces from ‘religious’ dominance.
Thus, more in aspirations than reality, the French concept of laïcité left
some legacy. However, if compared to what Laborde (2005) identifies as
the core values of republican laicité – the preservation of a shared, non-
sectarian public sphere; the distinction between the private and the public
identities of individuals; equality before the law and non-discrimination;
universal civic education in common schools; and the guarantee of equal
religious rights for all – the Belgian philosophy and tradition noticeably
diverges.
First, from its early existence, Belgium did not adhere to a strict doctrine
of separation between church and state. Although Liberals were opposed
to the dominance of the Catholic Church, many were also of the opinion
that it was in the state’s interest to support clerics and religious institutions,
because they promoted morality and social order. Rather than the result of
a particular ideal or ideology, the ‘active neutrality’ approach mainly
evolved from political compromises. Although it has inspired contempor-
ary multicultural policies, it should not be ignored that it is also extremely
demanding in terms of state financing. French republicanism could be
considered as highly demanding on citizens and religious organizations, but
active neutrality requires a great deal of financial solidarity. In the light of
an increasingly diversified society, the active neutrality approach is
nowadays challenged in its own pragmatic terms.
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Second, any meaningful attempt to construct the public domain as
homogenous and autonomous, a public identity of Belgian citizens, and a
corresponding civic education, was barred by the linguistic-communitarian
(Dutch and French speaking communities) and social-economic (Labour,
Capital) divides. If anything was to define Belgian identity, it would most
obviously be its many dimensions of diversity touching on all spheres of
human existence; from the cultural to the political, the social to the
economic (Martiniello, 2004).
Third, as a federal state, Belgium recognizes the existence of linguistic-
cultural minorities, adopting a multicultural logic that is opposed to the
individualistic rights paradigm and difference-blindness of French republi-
canism. However, it should be noted that Belgium also adopts different
logics for dealing with its different dimensions of diversity (Brems, 2006).
As far as the linguistic-cultural divide is concerned, a strict multiculturalism
is adopted, which is evidently not the case for other forms of diversity.
Although the existing recognition of diversity offers opportunities to new
groups to articulate their particular interests in the name of equal treat-
ment, it also makes it more difficult to articulate new dimensions of
diversity, such as gender diversity, alongside the already existing ones. For
instance, women’s organizations are not only regionalized, but also frag-
mented and for the most part tied to the different – Christian, Socialist and
Liberal – ‘pillars’.
Although the Belgian way of dealing with religious diversity is often
equated with the Dutch ‘pillarized’ model, ‘pillars’ in the Netherlands are
religiously delineated, while in Belgium they are defined in political and
ideological terms. Different from the Netherlands, Belgium does not have
a significant historical background of ‘religious’ pluralism, but has
remained, as has France, predominantly Catholic.
Next to all these traditional divisions, a new political and societal division
has developed in the past decades, particularly in Flanders, explicitly
concentrating on immigration issues. The xenophobic discourse of the
extreme right-wing nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), has
proven to be extremely successful electorally, ambiguously influencing
democratic political discourses and policies.
In the previous section, we referred to the idea of ‘active pluralism’. This
idea has recently been launched by a few academics (cf. Abicht, 2006) and
politicians (Stevaert, 2005) in Flanders as an alternative to both the French
Republican model and the Dutch–Belgian model of ‘pillarization’ or
‘passive pluralism’. Against the first, it is held that it does not guarantee an
official space for the expression of different religious and philosophical
beliefs; against the second, that ‘passive pluralism’ model merely enables
people to live ‘next to each other’ rather than ‘with each other’. Whereas
both models may have pacified past conflicts between different religious
and philosophical groups, in regard to new religious groups and notably
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Islam, it is argued that they have also contributed to ignorance and
hostility. Although the idea of ‘active pluralism’ seems inspiring for multi-
cultural policies, for instance, by stimulating initiatives in which different
religious and philosophical groups can learn from each other and from
dialogue on certain common issues, for the very same reason it may also be
considered as rather naive and it remains unclear how it could be imple-
mented within law and society (De Hert and Meerschaut, 2007).
THE HIJAB AS A FEMINIST ISSUE: A WOMAN’S CHOICE?
Most recent conflicts about the hijab in Belgium occur in the context of
public office. In 2007, the city council of Antwerp introduced a policy guide-
line that prohibits the wearing of any religious, ideological or political
symbol by employees of city offices who have direct contact with citizens
and residents. Although it is emphasized that citizens and other residents
should have extensive freedom to manifest their own religious beliefs
within the public sphere, for the same reason it is also argued that, in order
to cater to a highly diverse public, neutrality requires the restraint on the
expression of religious and ideological beliefs and opinion of civil servants
in direct contact with customers of public services.
This question has also been discussed by the aforementioned Com-
mission on Intercultural Dialogue. Although it was unanimously agreed
that neutrality is a fundamental value of democracy, it was also emphasized
that it is open to different acceptable interpretations. According to the
Commission’s report, neutrality can be understood as either inclusive (or
open) or exclusive (or closed) of differences. The first perspective argues
for the absence of limitations on the wearing of religious and ideological
symbols by civil servants, because the neutrality of officials should not relate
to their ‘appearance’ (garments and other symbols), but only to the acts
they perform as civil servants. It is further maintained that the visibility of
cultural and religious diversity in public institutions makes diversity a daily
and normal given and thus will favour a more tolerant attitude in society.
In this view, the dominant interpretation of neutrality is denounced as
exclusive, because it would selectively exclude signs and symbols that do
not belong to the northern European tradition. A second interpretation
requires restraint and rejects any form of religious expression among
officials in a position of authority or in direct contact with the public. A third
standpoint favours the absence of all religious and ideological signs for all
civil servants (CID, 2005: 57–8).
Although the Commission did not defend one particular interpretation,
it did launch the idea of an ‘alternative’ form of neutrality, an idea that
would be taken up later by various actors in the Belgian headscarf
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discussion, including pro-hijab feminist activists. Hence the launch and
dissemination of the idea of an ‘inclusive’ understanding of neutrality
elicited a paradoxical turn in the Belgian headscarf controversy. Rather
than a discussion on the question of how freedom of religion and other
fundamental rights (such as non-discrimination, gender equality, equal
opportunities in the workplace, etc.) should be articulated within a general
requirement of neutrality, the debate was for the most part reduced to a
problematic opposition between the ‘multicultural’ inclusive version and
the ‘republican’ exclusive version of neutrality.
In discussions of the hijab, and the Belgian case is no exception, the issue
of gender equality is sometimes a central concern and at other times
retreats from the top of the agenda, next to or in favour of other questions
of dealing with diversity, such as the relationship between religion and the
state, citizenship and multicultural accommodation. Yet gender relations,
and the status of Muslim women in particular, is undoubtedly an important
player in various headscarf controversies throughout Europe. As many
feminist and postcolonial analyses show, there is a broad historical tendency
to instrumentalize discourses on women’s rights in rallying against various
‘cultural’ practices such as veiling. It is argued that this kind of ‘colonial
feminism’ more often serves one’s own agenda in legitimizing and consoli-
dating further one’s own cultural, ideological or political power and supe-
riority (i.e. Abu-Lughod, 2002; Ahmed, 1992). However, in contrast to other
contentious topics in the multiculturalism versus feminism conundrum, in
European headscarf debates the principle of gender equality is often
deployed in diametrically opposed opinions. Whereas one side defends a
ban on the grounds of its allegedly oppressive meaning, the other contests
a prohibition because it would, conversely, put limitations on the freedom
of the person who chooses to wear the hijab.
In order to present a balanced portrayal of the way feminist arguments
were articulated in the Belgian hijab discussion, in this section we reflect
briefly on some of the positions taken and the activism that developed in
reaction to the political and media debate, among both the majority
feminist movement and Muslim women. For discussion typically took
place ‘in the names of’, yet ‘above the heads’ of, the very persons it
supposedly concerned. However, rather than merely being the stake of an
agenda that transcends their actual interests, we also argue that the
Belgian hijab question elicited the visibility of minority women who, as
active participants and actors, are struggling to be recognized as equal
partners in debates and policies on multiculturalism and equal oppor-
tunities. The result up to now has been that, more so than multicultural
policies, gender equality policies have responded to a diversification in
Belgian society.
Minority women’s organizations first took a public stand during the peak
of the Belgian headscarf controversy – preceded by the media coverage of
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the French Stasi Commission and law on laïcité – following the publication
in January 2004 in all main Belgian newspapers of an essay by the liberal
Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Domestic Affairs of the federal
government, Patrick Dewael (2004), entitled ‘Elke dwang tot sluieren is
onaanvaardbaar’ (Forced veiling is unacceptable). In this essay, the minister
argued for a headscarf ban in official schools and public services on the
grounds of both the neutrality principle and gender equality, and referred
extensively to the emancipation of Muslim women. According to Dewael,
although groups demanding their freedom of religion defend the right of
Muslim women to wear the headscarf, in practice this often comes down to
the ‘implicit acceptance of the order by Muslim men that their women must
be veiled’ (2004: 11).
In reaction to this paternalistic stance, some 32 minority women’s
organizations in Flanders signed an open protest letter directed to the
Minister. New organizations emerged such as the Actiecomité Voor
Moslimvrouwen in Vlaanderen (AMV; Action Committee for Muslim
Women in Flanders) and the platform and petition ‘Blijf van mijn hoofd-
doek’ (Keep off my headscarf) in Mechelen (Flanders), who vehemently
reject headscarf prohibitions at schools (Blijf van mijn hoofddoek, 2007). In
critique of the dominant presupposition that women with headscarves
would be ‘forced to veil’ or are ‘unemancipated’, organizations of Muslim
women such as the AMV (2005) and Al-Marifa (De Kennis) v.z.w. (2004)
(Brussels) also organized their own surveys on the wearing of headscarves.
More recent small-scale research and publications (c.f. Dala, 2005; Vander-
waeren, 2005) also undercut the simplistic association between veiling and
the oppression of all Muslim women, in line with a multitude of research in
neighbouring countries (c.f. Amiraux, 2003; Bartels, 2005) and beyond (c.f.
El Guindi, 1999; Gole, 1997; Mahmood, 2005).
As for the further development of both minority women’s activism
concerning the hijab and the positioning of feminist organizations through-
out Belgium, a somewhat different, yet by no means less diversified picture
can be presented from that of France (cf. Ezekiel, 2004; Winter, 2006). As
argued above, whereas the debate on the hijab in French-speaking Belgium
seems to be much more influenced by the French debate on laïcité, in
practice, women’s and feminist organizations of all kinds across the country
have taken on both pro- and anti-hijab and more intermediate positions.
For example, the vast range of standpoints is expressed in various main-
stream and minority women’s and feminist organizations throughout
Belgium having joined bi-communal and bilingual platforms against and for
headscarf bans in schools and public services, whereas both national, Fran-
cophone and Flemish women’s organizations similarly and variably either
support, reject or remain reticent on veiling practices and the wearing of
religious symbols on grounds ranging from gender equality to public
neutrality.
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The hijab affair has to some extent also provoked an ‘interculturaliza-
tion’ of white feminist organizations that had not previously addressed the
issue of cultural and religious diversity among women in Belgium. Some
organizations inspired by the philosophy of active pluralism, are gradually
engaging in intercultural dialogue and incorporating principles such as
inclusive neutrality into their visions and activities. Thus government-
supported organizations such as the Steunpunt Allochtone Meisjes en
Vrouwen (The Flemish Coordination Centre for Minority Girls and
Women – active in Flanders and Brussels) defend the right of pupils,
teachers and civil servants to wear a headscarf, and recently published a
substantial brochure offering methods for dealing and discussing the
headscarf in the classroom (Babazia and Perneel, 2006).
By contrast, anti-hijab positions such as that endorsed by the recently
launched (2006) independent Belgian Ni Putes Ni Soumises (NPNS)
movement – up to now only active in French-speaking Belgium – has not
received any comparable media attention to that of France. According to
the movements’ leaders, ‘social pressure, intimidation, verbal or physical
violence and forced marriages’ are also taking place in certain quarters of
Brussels (Van Dorsselaer, 2006). However, the lack of official data and any
substantiated research on the prevalence of gender inequalities such as
forced veiling makes it difficult to assess whether and/or to what extent the
situation in some major cities in Belgium compares to that of France.
Recently, white and minority women’s and feminist organizations have also
joined ranks, as in the launch of a platform and successful poster campaign
against what was perceived as the ‘female unfriendly’ decision of the
Antwerp city council against the headscarf in 2007 (c.f. earlier; see also Baas
Over Eigen Hoofd (BOEH!), n.d.). With the slogan ‘Headscarf? A
Woman’s Choice’, movements like these appeal to second wave feminist
‘choice’ rhetoric (cf. abortion rights). In this, they echo feminist pro-hijab
activism in France such as that of Christine Delphy (from Collectif Une
Ecole pour Toutes et Tous), and European initiatives such as the Assembly
for the Protection of Hijab.
Thus, whereas women’s/feminist organizations in Belgium may vary
considerably within and across ethnic, community, regional, philosophical
and political lines as to their position on the headscarf, one can to date infer
that feminist perspectives have not on the whole been as anti-hijab oriented
as in France. This corroborates our general analysis that the Belgian context
does not allow for any uniform or straightforwardly polarized (e.g. Franco-
phone versus Flemish) picture in feminist activism any more than in gender
equality policies. At federal, community and local levels, feminist – includ-
ing Muslim women’s – activism following the headscarf affair has to some
extent led to increased attention on the status and needs of minority
women, with initiatives that may go beyond the colonial feminist ‘victimiza-
tion’ trope that often accompanies anti-multiculturalist and racist
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positions.7 However, minority policies, as noted earlier, take different forms
along the linguistic-communitarian fracture, and to date do not pay sub-
stantial attention to gender issues.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although highly complex and diversified, the Belgian hijab question may
nevertheless serve as an illuminating and instructive case in both analytical
and pragmatic terms. First, the Belgian nation state embodies a historically
established compromise (constitutional, institutional) between two different
regimes of dealing with religious and philosophical pluralism in society, i.e.
that of republican neutrality and that of state-supported religious
accommodation. Complex institutional compromises that have been
worked out in response to a particular history are nowadays challenged by
the presence and demands of new religious groups in society. As a main
symbol of this religious otherness, the headscarf issue touches upon this and
has invoked renewed attention to the issue of secularity and religious
accommodation.
In addition, and as is often amusingly remarked, the Belgian federal state
can be considered as a comparative case regarding different models and
policies of multiculturalism. Throughout the more recent process of
federalization, policy making and jurisdiction, including on education and
minorities, is delegated to the (linguistic-cultural) community level and
allows the main parts of the country – Flanders and Wallonia – to follow
different philosophies and practices of integration that are, respectively,
close to the Anglo-Saxon ethnic (and formerly Dutch) minority model and
the French citizenship model.
The headscarf debate in Belgium did not lead to a general ban, yet
schools, local governments and private employers are increasingly introduc-
ing various measures resulting in restrictions on veiling. Although one
would expect that practices would differ among the different regions, as of
yet, clear tendencies to this effect cannot be ascertained, and this can be
explained by a complex interplay of various factors. Differences between
the regions are most pronounced at the level of discourse. A stronger
affinity with the French republican model of laïcité is to be found in some
of the feminist anti-hijab positioning on the French-speaking side, whereas
Dutch-speaking pro-hijab discourse shows a more explicit affinity with
multicultural philosophy. However, the latter is paradoxically sometimes
also appropriated in order to justify limitations on displaying religious
symbols. Thus, the Antwerp city council claimed that its prohibition would
contribute to the promotion rather than impeding cultural diversity in its
town and personnel management. Antwerp is also home to the extreme
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right-wing party, Flemish Interest, who unavoidably yet ambiguously influ-
enced the political agenda of the democratic parties. In its xenophobic and
racist discourse, ‘Islam’ features as an increasingly important identity
marker in securing the boundaries of the ‘Flemish people’.
Yet the hijab issue, besides perpetuating prejudice on Islam as a patri-
archal, theocratic and fundamentalist religion, has also elicited more
substantial debates on the relationship between religion and the state, inter-
religious and life-stance initiatives and, recently, concrete efforts to
acknowledge Islam in Belgian society. Finally, attention has been drawn to
the gender dimension amidst the current diversification of the already
highly diversified Belgian society. A more promising effect of the headscarf
controversy has certainly been its contribution to bringing women of
minority groups out of public invisibility, and the gradual inclusion of their
interests on the political agenda. Less troubled by various ‘diversity’
conflicts of the past and present, and more inspired by transnational and
European dynamics, gender and equal opportunity policies may offer some
institutional space in which the interests of new minorities and minority
women in particular can be articulated.
Notes
1 Avis du Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée générale, 27 novembre 1989. In the following
years, a radicalization emerged and hostility towards the wearing of the headscarf
increased.
2 Local Court decision, Brussels, 1 December 1989 and Report of the auditor of
the State Council, 30 October 1992 (Brems, 2004).
3 See, for example, Goethals (1996) for a case study of the headscarf affairs in
municipal schools in Ghent (Flanders) that took place in the early 1990s.
4 AEL is an identity movement (mainly of young Moroccan Muslims) that origi-
nated in Antwerp in 2000, but has also been active in the Netherlands. Although
the movement has currently disappeared from media attention, in its formative
years the government reacted in a very repressive way against the movement and
it was often accused of Islamism.
5 Thus, the Flemish community is responsible for education in the Flemish
provinces and for Dutch-speaking schools in Brussels; the French community is
responsible for education in the Walloon provinces and for French-speaking
schools in Brussels.
6 In a case in which six pupils lodged a complaint against the school regulations of
a provincial secondary school that prohibited the wearing of a head covering
within the classroom, the study rooms and the dining room, the Court of Appeal
in Antwerp (14 June 2005) noted that neutrality, in the sense of laïcité, demands
an effort of the religions as such as well as of each individual, and that in the
context of ‘neutral’ (secular) education, some distance should be taken regarding
the religious tradition without implying the belying of one’s nature (see Court of
Appeal, Antwerp, 2005).
7 For example, the Flemish Equal Opportunities Minister’s current policy letter
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(2004–09) applies an intersectional approach and prioritizes the emancipation of
minority women. She has approached (previously ignored) minority women’s
self-organizations (both secular and religious) in order to start up a dialogue that
may lead to concrete actions. In Wallonia, the current Ministry of Social Action,
Health and Equal Opportunities, among others, is committed to combating
sexism in education and employment, with particular attention to immigrant
women and women from foreign backgrounds.
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